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First, a statute should expressly limit its effect so as to prevent recovery
by a third party based upon the imputed negligence. It should not be
used as a basis for a suit or counterclaim by a third party against a person who has no right of control over his bailee, vendee, or the agent,
servant or employee of such bailee or vendee. Secondly, the legislature
should frame the statute so that there can be no misunderstanding of
the meaning of "agent," "servant" or "employee" within the act. If
this is done, Wisconsin courts will be able to handle such situations,
which have come under much criticism, in a fair and equitable manner.
DOUGLAS J. MCCLELLAND
Judgments - Equitable Relief from Judgments Obtained by
deceased had been sued for
Fraud, Intrinsic and Extrinsic -The
divorce by the plaintiff in 1946 and in his answer set for his
property with particularly. The plaintiff at that time had no knomwledge of the amount of property owned by the deceased and was not
guilty of negligence in ascertaining the facts. The court relied on the
defendant's representations and confirmed a pre-trial stipulation as to
the apportionment of the defendant's property. On learning of the
actual holdings of the decedent at an inventory and appraisal filed
after his death, the plaintiff sued the executor of the decedent's estate
in equity praying for relief from the property settlement on the
ground that it was based on the decedent's fraud perpetrated on the
court. The relief was not granted by the trial court. Held: Judgment
reversed. The power of a court of equity to relieve against unconscionable judgments for fraud will not be strictly confined to those that are
characterized by extrinsic fraud. Weber v. Weber et al, 260 Wis. 420,
51 N.W. 2nd 18 (1952).
The general rule in the United States is that the acts for which a
court of equity will grant relief from a judgment because of fraud
must relate to extrinsic or collateral fraud and that intrinsic fraud
is not sufficient."
The United States Supreme Court followed that rule in United
States v. Throckmorton, and defined extrinsic fraud as that relating
to matter not tried by the court rendering the judgment and intrinsic
fraud as that relating to matter on which the decree was rendered,
and stated that:
"Where the unsuccessful party had been prevented from
exhibiting full his case, by fraud or deception practised on him
by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false
promise of compromise; or where the defendant never had
knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by acts of the
131 AM. JUR. JUDGMENTS §654 (1940).
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plaintiff, or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority
assumes to represent a party and connives at his defeat; or
where the attorney regularly employed corruptly sells out his
client's interest to the other side-these, and similar cases which
show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or
hearing of the case, are reasons for which a new suit may be
or decree,
sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment
2
and open the case for a new and fair hearing."
Then thirteen years later while not overruling that decision because
its final judgment was based on other principles, the Supreme Court
stated it was a settled doctrine that if it be against the conscience of
the court to execute a judgment, any fact of which the injured party
could have availed himself but was prevented by fraud unmixed with
any negligence on his part will justify an application to a court of
3
chancery.
Again the Supreme Court held that, where the enforcement of a
judgment would be "manifestly unconscionable," they have the power
to grant relief from such a judgment though again the decision was
based on another issue. 4
Nevertheless, the Throckmorton rule has not been expressly overruled and is followed in the majority of the state courts in the United
States including those of our sister states, Iowa and Michigan. 5
Extrinsic fraud has been defined as actual fraud such that there is
on the part of the person chargeable with it mala sens, acting to take
undue advantage of some one else for the purpose of defrauding him.8
But while intrinsic and extrinsic fraud are the terms generally accepted to describe the differences in types of fraud, they do not constitute a simple and infallible formula to determine whether in a given
case the facts surrounding the fraud warrant equitable relief from a
7
judgment.
The Wisconsin Court has adopted as its basic rule:
"That the chancery will relieve against judgment at law on
the ground of its being contrary to equity when defendant was
ignorant of the fact in question pending the suit or it could not
have been received as a defense by fraud or accident or the acts
of the8 other party unmixed with negligence or fault on his
part."
United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 25 L.Ed. 93 (1878).
3Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589, 35 L.Ed. 870, 12 S.Ct. 62 (1891).
4Pickford v. Talbot, 225 U.S. 651, 56 L.Ed. 1240, 32 S.Ct. 687.
5 Graves v. Graves, 132 Iowa 199, 109 N.W. 707 (1906) ;
Leslie v. Procter &Gamble Mfg. Co., 102 Kan. 159, 169 P. 193 (1917);
Steele v. Culver, 157 Mich. 344, 122 N.W. 95 (1909) ;
2

Scudder v. Evans, 105 Neb. 292, 180 N.W. 254 (1920);
6 Flood v. Templeton, 152 Cal. 148, 92 P. 78 (1907), quoting Patch v. Ward L.R.
(1867) 3 Ch.App. 207.
7
Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 32 Cal. 2d 13, 193 P. 2d 728 (1948).
8 Stowell Stal v. Eldred, 26 Wis. 504 (1870).
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The court has realized that the invention of a formula for extrinsic
and intrinsic fraud has not solved the problems of applying it in particular cases and under particular circumstancesY Even the Throckmorton Case does not assume to do more than state a general rule.
Realizing this the Wisconsin, Court held in a case where a judgment had been obtained by fraud and perjury of the successful party
that equity suffers no wrong to be done without a remedy where the
wrong is so serious that it will disturb the conscience of the court of
equity, and where there is no equitable defense available against the
party defrauded3 ° That rule is approved in a later Wisconsin Case
though plaintiff did not prove he was not guilty of inexcusable neglect
in asserting his right to relief."'
Then in Laun v. Kipp12 it was held that while the precedents of
the Wisconsin Court go only to the extent of holding that a judgment
secured by wilful perjury may under some circumstances be relieved
from in equity, that does not establish an exclusive situation where
intrinsic fraud can be dealt with but that the power of equity in relieving from an unconscionable judgment will not be confined to those
characterized by intrinsic fraud. That court also stated that where
there is a duty to speak and there is a failure to do so, there is a fraud
of a most serious nature, and that both intrinsic and extrinsic fraud
must be proved clearly and satisfactorily.
There are three Wisconsin cases which have seemingly adopted the
rule of the Throckmorton Case. In Uecher v. Thedt 13 and Routledge v.
Patterson'4 there was neither a showing that the fraud complained of
was the basis for the rendition of the judgment nor that the judgment
was inequitable on the facts as they really existed. In the other case,
Willeard v. Wenkelson 5 the plaintiff had deserted her husband and
was served with a summons and complaint, but the issue on which
she based her appeal was tendered in the divorce action at which she
did not appear.
Further distinction can be drawn from the fact that in each of
these cases the appellant requested the, divorce be set aside while in
the instant case relief was granted only from the division of the
estate.
9 Broeng v. Ott, 138 Wis. 260, 119 N.W. 865 (1909).

10 Ibid. The Wisconsin Supreme Court said, "We believe it is in harmony with

the general rules of equity and best calculated to the doctrine so often enunciated by this and other courts 'that equity suffers no wrong to go without a
remedy, the -wrong being of sufficient gravity to be appreciated by the conscience of the chancellor, and application being made to its jurisdiction seasonably and with clean hands."'
"Schulteis v. Trade Press Publishing Co., 191 Wis. 164, 210 N.W. 419 (1926).
12Laun v. Kipp, 155 Wis. 347, 145 N.W. 183 (1914).
13 Uecher v. Thedt, 133 Wis. 148,113 N.W. 447 (1907).
14 Routledge v. Patterson, 146 Wis. 226, 131 N.W. 346 (1911).
25 Willeard v. Wenkelson, 191 Wis. 406, 211 N.W. 137 (1926).
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The last case on this matter in Wisconsin prior to the instant case
stated that, regardless of the differentiating facts, Laun v Kipp overruled Uecher v. Sheer wherever they were in conflict and that the
Wisconsin rule is that intrinsic fraud is sufficient under certain circumstances to warrant intervention of court of equity in relieving
from unconscionable judgments. 16 The instant case firmly establishes
this as the controlling law in this forum.
The Throckmorton Case bases its general rule on the fear that the
trouble of retrying each case would be much greater and work
greater hardship than the compensation that would arise from doing
justice in particular cases. This fear seems to be groundless because
in Wisconsin only seven cases have reached the Supreme Court on
this issue since Laun v. Kipp, which expressly rejected the Throckmorton rule.

17

The position of the Wisconsin Courts seems to be more in harmony
with the spirit and purpose of equity as originally conceived and is a
commendable attempt to escape from the rigidity of rules which to a
considerable extent have destroyed the discretion and effectiveness of
equity courts.18 It is also in harmony with Rule 60 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure which rejects the Throckmorton rule.19 It
would seem that this rule should be universally adopted.
DONALD GRIFFIN, JR.

Estoppel-Effect of Overruling a Judicial Decision-Equitable
Estoppel against the Taxing Power of the State-The Wisconsin
Legislature had established a tax' on the declaration by foreign corporations of dividends based on income earned in the state, but the
petitioner relied on an earlier decision of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court2 and did not deduct the tax from dividends paid by it in the
years 1944 through 1946 because profits were insufficient to offset
losses previously accumulated in the state. The Wisconsin Department
of Taxation acknowledged the same Supreme Court decision and did
not question the petitioner's action until the Supreme Court reversed
its stand in a subsequent case.3 Thereupon, the Department of Taxation assessed the privilege dividend tax against the petitioner upon
Wis. 653, 271 N.W. 396 (1937).
Note, 3 ALA. L. REv. 224 (1950-51).
FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS Sec. 1233 (5th ed., 1925).
'LoFed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)
".... court may relieve a party or his legal representative from
order, or preceding for the following reasons:
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
I WIS. STATS. (1951), sec. 71.16.
2 J. C. Penny Co. v. Tax.Commission, 238 Wis. 69, 298 N.W. 186
3
Department of Taxation v. Nash-Kelvinator Corp., 250 Wis.
899 (1947).
16 Amberg v. Denton, 223
8.7

a final judgment,
extrinsic)

...

(1941).
533, 27 N.W. 2d

